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Abstract
Compromising social network accounts has become a
profitable course of action for cybercriminals. By hijack-
ing control of a popular media or business account, at-
tackers can distribute their malicious messages or dissem-
inate fake information to a large user base. The impacts of
these incidents range from a tarnished reputation to multi-
billion dollar monetary losses on financial markets. In our
previous work, we demonstrated how we can detect large-
scale compromises (i.e., so-called campaigns) of regular
online social network users. In this work, we show how
we can use similar techniques to identify compromises of
individual high-profile accounts. High-profile accounts
frequently have one characteristic that makes this detec-
tion reliable – they show consistent behavior over time.
We show that our system, were it deployed, would have
been able to detect and prevent three real-world attacks
against popular companies and news agencies. Further-
more, our system, in contrast to popular media, would not
have fallen for a staged compromise instigated by a US
restaurant chain for publicity reasons.
1 Introduction
Online social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter,
have become one of the main media to stay in touch with
the rest of the world. Celebrities use them to communicate
with their fan base, corporations take advantage of them
to promote their brands and have a direct connection to
their customers, while news agencies leverage social net-
works to distribute breaking news. Regular users make
pervasive use of social networks too, to stay in touch with
their friends or colleagues and share content that they find
interesting.
Over time, social network users build trust relationships
with the accounts they follow. This trust can develop for
a variety of reasons. For example, the user might know
the owner of the trusted account in person or the account
might be operated by an entity commonly considered as
trustworthy, such as a popular news agency. Unfortu-
nately, should the control over an account fall into the
hands of a cyber criminal, he can easily exploit this trust
to further his own malicious agenda. Previous research
showed that using compromised accounts to spread mali-
cious content is advantageous to cyber criminals, because
social network users are more likely to react to messages
coming from accounts they trust [1].
These favorable probabilities of success exceedingly
attract the attention of cyber criminals. Once an attacker
compromises a social network account he can use it for
nefarious purposes such as sending spam messages or link
to malware and phishing web sites [2]. Such traditional
attacks are best carried out through a large population of
compromised accounts belonging to regular social net-
work account users. Recent incidents, however, demon-
strate that attackers can cause havoc and interference even
by compromising individual, but high-profile accounts.
These accounts (e.g., newspaper or popular brand name
accounts) have large social circles (i.e., followers) and
their popularity suggests trustworthiness to many social
network users. Recent attacks show that compromising
these high profile accounts can be leveraged to dissem-
inate fake news alerts, or messages that tarnish a com-
pany’s reputation [3, 4, 5, 6].
Moreover, the effects of an account compromise can
extend well beyond the reputation of a company. For
example, the dissemination of an erroneous Associated
Press (AP) news story about a bomb exploding in the
White House in 2013 led to a 1% drop in the Standard &
Poor’s 500 index, temporarily wiping out US$ 136B [7].
Compromises of high profile accounts usually get cleaned
up quickly after they are detected. Unfortunately, since
detection is still exclusively a manual endeavor, this is
often too late to mitigate the negative impacts of ac-
count compromises. For example, the above mentioned
AP message was shared by over 3,000 users before the
compromise was detected and the offending message re-
moved. Similarly, a message sent as a consequence of
a compromise of the Skype Twitter account happening
during a national holiday remained accessible for over a
day [6]. These incidents show that it is critical for a so-
cial network to be able to reliably detect and block mes-
sages that have not been authored by an account’s legiti-
mate owner.
A wealth of research was proposed in the last years to
detect malicious activity on online social networks. Most
of these systems, however, focus on detecting fake ac-
counts specifically created to spread malicious content,
instead of looking for legitimate accounts that have been
compromised [8, 9, 10]. These systems are inadequate
to detect compromised accounts, because legitimate, yet
compromised accounts have significantly different char-
acteristics than fake ones. Other mitigation techniques
have a more general scope, and either detect malicious
accounts by grouping together similar messages [11, 12]
or by looking at the presence of suspicious URLs in so-
cial network messages [13, 14]. These systems can de-
tect messages that are sent by compromised social net-
work accounts, in case cybercriminals use multiple ac-
counts to send similar messages, or the messages are used
to advertise web pages pointing to malware or phishing.
In the case of the high-profile compromises mentioned
before, however, neither of these conditions apply: the
compromises each consisted of a single message, and no
URLs were contained in any of the messages. Therefore,
previously-proposed systems are inadequate to detect this
type of compromises.
In this paper we present COMPA, the first detection sys-
tem designed to identify compromised social network ac-
counts. COMPA is based on a simple observation: social
network users develop habits over time, and these habits
are fairly stable. A typical social network user, for ex-
ample, might consistently check her posts in the morning
from her phone, and during the lunch break from her desk-
top computer. Furthermore, interaction will likely be lim-
ited to a moderate number of social network contacts (i.e.,
friends). Conversely, if the account falls under the control
of an adversary, the messages that the attacker sends will
likely show anomalies compared to the typical behavior
of the user.
To detect account compromises, COMPA builds a be-
havioral profile for social network accounts, based on
the messages sent by the account in the past. Every
time a new message is generated, the message is com-
pared against this behavioral profile. If the message sig-
nificantly deviates from the learned behavioral profile,
COMPA flags it as a possible compromise. In this pa-
per we first show that high profile accounts often have
well-defined behavioral profiles that allow COMPA to de-
tect compromises with very low false positives. How-
ever, behavioral profiles of regular user accounts are more
variable than their well-defined counterparts of most high
profile accounts. This is because regular users are more
likely to experiment with new features or client software
to engage with the social network. This variability could
cause an increase of false positive alerts. However, social
network accounts of regular users are less influential than
high profile accounts. Thus, attackers aggregate multiple
accounts into a campaign to achieve effects that are sim-
ilar to the compromise of a high profile account. COMPA
uses this insight to first identify campaigns by means of
message similarity and only labels accounts as compro-
mised if a significant portion of messages in a campaign
violate the behavioral profile of their underlying account.
This allows us to keep false positives low, while still be-
ing able to detect accounts that are victims of large-scale
compromises.
To evaluate COMPA, we applied it to four Twitter com-
promises that affected high profile accounts over the last
three years. We show that our system would have been
able to detect those malicious messages before they were
posted, avoiding the fake information to spread. We also
show a case study of a compromise that was faked by
the Chipotle Twitter account for promotional reasons; in
this case COMPA correctly detected that the alleged mali-
cious messages did not deviate from the regular behavior
of the account. Finally, we also applied COMPA to two
datasets from Twitter and Facebook, looking for large-
scale compromises. The Twitter dataset consists of 1.4
billion messages we collected from May 13, 2011 to Au-
gust 12, 2011, while the Facebook dataset contains 106
million messages ranging from September 2007 to July
2009 collected from several large geographic networks.
Our results show that COMPA is effective in detecting
compromised accounts with very few false positives. In
particular, we detected 383,613 compromised accounts on
Twitter, and 11,087 compromised accounts on Facebook.
In summary, this paper makes the following contribu-
tions:
• We present COMPA, the first system designed to de-
tect compromised social network accounts.
• We show that COMPA can reliably detect compro-
mises that affect high profile accounts. Since the
behavior of these accounts is very consistent, false
positives are minimal.
• To detect large-scale compromises, we propose to
group similar messages together and apply COMPA
to them, to assess how many of those messages vio-
late their accounts’ behavioral profile. This grouping
accounts for the fact that regular social network ac-
counts show a more variable behavior compared to
high profile ones, and allows us to keep false posi-
tives low.
• We apply COMPA to two datasets from popular so-
cial networks, Facebook and Twitter, and show that
our system would have been able to detect hundreds
of thousands of compromised accounts. We also
show that COMPA would have been able to detect
four high-profile compromises that affected popular
Twitter accounts, and to correctly flag as legitimate
a fake compromise that was attempted by a US fast
food chain on their Twitter account for promotional
reasons.
Comparison with previous published version. This pa-
per is the extended version of our previous work [15] that
was published at the Network and Distributed Systems
Security Symposium in 2013. Compared to the original
paper, in which we focused on large-scale compromises
that affect thousands of social network accounts at the
same time, in this paper we also look at isolated com-
promises that affect high- profile accounts. We show that
such accounts typically show a very consistent behavior,
and therefore COMPA can reliably detect compromises
against them. To demonstrate this, we analyzed four com-
promises of high-profile accounts that made the news dur-
ing the past three years, showing that COMPA would have
detected them.
2 Background: Social Network
Compromises
In the following, we illustrate four case studies where
high-profile Twitter accounts were compromised. We will
use these case studies to both show how critical a social
network compromise can be for a company, as well as
how our system could be used to detect and ultimately
prevent such attacks.
Associated Press. On April 23rd 2013, the Twitter
account of the Associated Press (@AP) was compro-
mised [4]. The account was misused to distribute false
information about president Obama being hurt by an ex-
plosion in the White House. This message had an interest-
ing side effect: seconds after being posted, it was used as
a signal of negative events by automated trading bots on
the New York stock exchange. This signal lead to a per-
ceivable drop in the market index which recovered after
the information was confirmed to be false [7]. This inci-
dent shows how a social network compromise can have
significant effects on the real world.
FoxNews Politics. On July 4th 2011, the Twitter ac-
count of Fox News’ politics (@foxnewspolitics) division
got compromised [3]. The attackers used this opportunity
to distribute the information that president Obama got as-
sassinated.
Skype. On new year’s day 2014, the Twitter account of
the Skype Voip service was compromised. The attacker
used his access to discourage the use of Mircrosoft’s email
products for the fear of disclosing information to govern-
ment agencies. We would assume that an observant legit-
imate owner of the account would detect such a malicious
message during their regular activity. However, presum-
ably because of the holiday season, it took more than two
hours before the offending message was removed by the
legitimate owners of the Skype account. In the meantime,
the offending message got retweeted over 8,000 times.
This incident prominently demonstrates the advantages an
automated technique for the detection of compromised ac-
counts would entail, as such attacks can have significant
negative impact on a brand’s online reputation.
Yahoo! News. More recently, in August 2014, Yahoo!’s
news account (@YahooNews) also got compromised and
used to disseminate false information regarding an Ebola
outbreak in Atlanta, GA.
To prevent social network accounts from being com-
promised, we propose to learn the typical behavior of a
user, and flag a message as a possible compromise if it
does not match the learned behavior. In the following
section, we describe in detail the behavioral profile that
we leverage as part of our system. In Section 7.4 we pro-
vide details on the anomalies generated by the four de-
scribed high-profile incidents, which allowed COMPA to
detect them.
3 Behavioral Profiles
A behavioral profile leverages historical information
about the activities of a social network user to capture this
user’s normal (expected) behavior. To build behavioral
profiles, our system focuses on the stream of messages
that a user has posted on the social network. Of course,
other features such as profile pictures or social activity
(e.g., establishing friend or follower relationships) could
be useful as well. Unfortunately, social networks typi-
cally do not offer a way to retrieve historical data about
changes in these features, and therefore, we were unable
to use them.
A behavioral profile for a user U is built in the follow-
ing way: Initially, our system obtains the stream of mes-
sages of U from the social networking site. The message
stream is a list of all messages that the user has posted
on the social network, in chronological order. For differ-
ent social networks, the message streams are collected in
slightly different ways. For example, on Twitter, the mes-
sage stream corresponds to a user’s public timeline. For
Facebook, the message stream contains the posts a user
wrote on her own wall, but it also includes the messages
that this user has posted on her friends’ walls.
To be able to build a comprehensive profile, the stream
needs to contain a minimum amount of messages. In-
tuitively, a good behavioral profile has to capture the
breadth and variety of ways in which a person uses her
social network account (e.g., different client applications
or languages). Otherwise, an incomplete profile might in-
correctly classify legitimate user activity as anomalous.
Therefore, we do not create behavioral profiles for ac-
counts whose stream consists of less than a minimum
number S of messages. In our experiments, we empir-
ically determined that a stream consisting of less than
S = 10 messages does usually not contain enough variety
to build a representative behavioral profile for the corre-
sponding account. Furthermore, profiles that contain less
then S messages pose a limited threat to the social net-
work or its users. This is because such accounts are either
new or very inactive and thus, their contribution to large
scale campaigns is limited. A detailed discussion of this
threshold is provided in our previous work [15].
Once our system has obtained the message stream for
a user, we use this information to build the correspond-
ing behavioral profile. More precisely, the system extracts
a set of feature values from each message, and then, for
each feature, trains a statistical model. Each of these mod-
els captures a characteristic feature of a message, such as
the time the message was sent, or the application that was
used to generate it. The features used by these models, as
well as the models themselves, are described later in this
section.
Given the behavioral profile for a user, we can assess to
what extent a new message corresponds to the expected
behavior. To this end, we compute the anomaly score
for a message with regard to the user’s established pro-
file. The anomaly score is computed by extracting the
feature values for the new message, and then comparing
these feature values to the corresponding feature models.
Each model produces a score (real value) in the interval
[0, 1], where 0 denotes perfectly normal (for the feature
under consideration) and 1 indicates that the feature is
highly anomalous. The anomaly score for a message is
then calculated by composing the results for all individ-
ual models.
3.1 Modelling Message Characteristics
Our approach models the following seven features when
building a behavioral profile.
Time (hour of day). This model captures the hour(s)
of the day during which an account is typically active.
Many users have certain periods during the course of a
day where they are more likely to post (e.g., lunch breaks)
and others that are typically quiet (e.g., regular sleeping
hours). If a user’s stream indicates regularities in social
network usage, messages that appear during hours that are
associated with quiet periods are considered anomalous.
Message Source. The source of a message is the name
of the application that was used to submit it. Most so-
cial networking sites offer traditional web and mobile web
access to their users, along with applications for mobile
platforms such as iOS and Android. Many social network
ecosystems provide access to a multitude of applications
created by independent, third-party developers.
Of course, by default, a third-party application cannot
post messages to a user’s account. However, if a user
chooses to, she can grant this privilege to an application.
The state-of-the-art method of governing the access of
third-party applications is OAUTH [16]. OAUTH is im-
plemented by Facebook and Twitter, as well as numerous
other, high-profile web sites, and enables a user to grant
access to her profile without revealing her credentials.
By requiring all third-party applications to implement
OAUTH, the social network operators can easily shut
down individual applications, should that become neces-
sary. In fact, our evaluation shows that third-party appli-
cations are frequently used to send malicious messages.
This model determines whether a user has previously
posted with a particular application or whether this is the
first time. Whenever a user posts a message from a new
application, this is a change that could indicate that an at-
tacker has succeeded to lure a victim into granting access
to a malicious application.
Message Text (Language). A user is free to author her
messages in any language. However, we would expect
that each user only writes messages in a few languages
(typically, one or two). Thus, especially for profiles where
this feature is relatively stable, a change in the language
is an indication of a suspicious change in user activity.
To determine the language that a message was writ-
ten in, we leverage the libtextcat library. This li-
brary performs n-gram-based text categorization, as pro-
posed by Cavnar and Trenkle [17]. Of course, for very
short messages, it is often difficult to determine the lan-
guage. This is particularly problematic for Twitter mes-
sages, which are limited to at most 140 characters and fre-
quently contain abbreviated words or uncommon spelling.
Message Topic. Users post many messages that contain
chatter or mundane information. But we would also ex-
pect that many users have a set of topics that they fre-
quently talk about, such as favorite sports teams, music
bands, or TV shows. When users typically focus on a
few topics in their messages and then suddenly post about
some different and unrelated subject, this new message
should be rated as anomalous.
In general, inferring message topics from short snippets
of text without context is difficult. However, some so-
cial networking platforms allow users to label messages
to explicitly specify the topics their messages are about.
When such labels or tags are available, they provide a
valuable source of information. A well-known example
of a message-tagging mechanism are Twitter’s hashtags.
By prefixing the topic keyword with a hash character a
user would use #Olympics to associate her tweet with
the Olympic Games. Using hashtags to identify topics in
messages have become so popular that Facebook decided
in August 2013 to incorporate this feature unmodified.
More sophisticated (natural language processing) tech-
niques to extract message topics are possible. However,
such techniques are out of scope of this work.
Links in Messages. Often, messages posted on social
networking sites contain links to additional resources,
such as blogs, pictures, videos, or news articles. Links
in messages of social networks are so common that some
previous work has strongly focused on the analysis of
URLs, often as the sole factor, to determine whether a
message is malicious or not. We also make use of links
as part of the behavioral profile of a user. However, in
our system the link information only represents a single
dimension (i.e., feature) in the feature vector describing
a message. Moreover, recall that our features are primar-
ily concerned with capturing the normal activity of users.
That is, we do not attempt to detect whether a URL is ma-
licious in itself but rather whether a link is different than
what we would expect for a certain user.
To model the use of links in messages, we only make
use of the domain name in the URL of links. The reason
is that a user might regularly refer to content on the same
domain. For example, many users tend to read specific
news sites and blogs, and frequently link to interesting ar-
ticles there. Similarly, users might have preferences for a
certain URL shortening service. Of course, the full link
differs among these messages (as the URL path and URL
parameters address different, individual pages). The do-
main part, however, remains constant. Malicious links, on
the other hand, point to sites that have no legitimate use.
Thus, messages that link to domains that have not been
observed in the past indicate a change. The model also
considers the general frequency of messages with links,
and the consistency with which a user links to particular
sites.
Direct User Interaction. Social networks offer mech-
anisms to directly interact with an individual user. The
most common way of doing this is by sending a direct
message that is addressed to the recipient. Different social
networks have different mechanisms for doing that. For
example, on Facebook, one posts on the recipient user’s
wall; on Twitter, it is possible to directly “mention” other
users by putting the @ character before the recipient’s
user name. Over time, a user builds a personal interac-
tion history with other users on the social network. This
feature aims to capture the interaction history for a user.
In fact, it keeps track of the users an account ever inter-
acted with. Direct messages are sent to catch the attention
of their recipients, and thus are frequently used by spam-
mers.
Proximity. In many cases, social network users befriend
other users that are geographically or contextually close
to them. For example, a typical Facebook user will have
many friends that live in the same city, went to the same
school, or work for the same company. If this user sud-
denly started interacting with people who live on another
continent, this could be suspicious. Some social network-
ing sites (such as Facebook) express this proximity no-
tion by grouping their users into networks. The proximity
model looks at the messages sent by a user. If a user sends
a message to somebody in the same network, this message
is considered as local. Otherwise, it is considered as not
local. This feature captures the fraction of local vs. non-
local messages.
4 Training and Evaluation of the
Models
In a nutshell, COMPA works as follows: for each social
network user, we retrieve the past messages that the user
has authored. We then extract features for each mes-
sage, and build behavioral models for each feature sep-
arately. Then, we assess whether each individual feature
is anomalous or not, based on previous observations. Fi-
nally, we combine the anomaly scores for each feature
to obtain a global anomaly score for each message. This
score indicates whether the account has likely been com-
promised. In the following, we describe our approach in
more detail.
Training. The input for the training step of a feature
model is the series of messages (the message stream) that
were extracted from a user account. For each message, we
extract the relevant features such as the source application
and the domains of all links.
Each feature model is represented as a set Mf . Each
element of Mf is a tuple < fv, c >. fv is the value
of a feature (e.g., English for the language model, or
example.com for the link model). c denotes the num-
ber of messages in which the specific feature value fv was
present. In addition, each model stores the total number
N of messages that were used for training.
Our models fall into two categories:
• Mandatory models are those where there is one fea-
ture value for each message, and this feature value
is always present. Mandatory models are time of the
day, source, proximity, and language.
• Optional models are those for which not every mes-
sage has to have a value. Also, unlike for manda-
tory models, it is possible that there are multiple fea-
ture values for a single message. Optional models
are links, direct interaction, and topic. For example,
it is possible that a message contains zero, one, or
multiple links. For each optional model, we reserve
a specific element with fv = null, and associate
with this feature value the number of messages for
which no feature value is present (e.g., the number
of messages that contain no links).
The training phase for the time of the day model works
slightly differently. Based on the previous description,
our system would first extract the hour of the day for each
message. Then, it would store, for each hour fv, the num-
ber of messages that were posted during this hour. This
approach has the problem that strict one hour intervals,
unlike the progression of time, are discrete. Therefore,
messages that are sent close to a user’s “normal” hours
could be incorrectly considered as anomalous.
To avoid this problem, we perform an adjustment step
after the time of the day model was trained (as described
above). In particular, for each hour i, we consider the val-
ues for the two adjacent hours as well. That is, for each
element < i, ci > of Mf , a new count c′i is calculated
as the average between the number of messages observed
during the ith hour (ci), the number of messages sent dur-
ing the previous hour (ci−1), and the ones observed during
the following hour (ci+1). After we computed all c′i, we
replace the corresponding, original values in Mf .
As we mentioned previously, we cannot reliably build
a behavioral profile if the message stream of a user is too
short. Therefore, the training phase is aborted for streams
shorter than S = 10, and any message sent by those users
is not evaluated.
Evaluating a new message. When calculating the
anomaly score for a new message, we want to evaluate
whether this message violates the behavioral profile of a
user for a given model. In general, a message is consid-
ered more anomalous if the value for a particular feature
did not appear at all in the stream of a user, or it appeared
only a small number of times. For mandatory features,
the anomaly score of a message is calculated as follows:
1. The feature fv for the analyzed model is first ex-
tracted from the message. If Mf contains a tuple
with fv as a first element, then the tuple < fv, c >
is extracted from Mf . If there is no tuple in Mf with
fv as a first value, the message is considered anoma-
lous. The procedure terminates here and an anomaly
score of 1 is returned.
2. As a second step, the approach checks if fv is
anomalous at all for the behavioral profile built for
the feature under consideration. c is compared to
M¯f , which is defined as M¯f =
∑‖Mf ‖
i=1
ci
N
, where
ci is, for each tuple in Mf , the second element of the
tuple. If c is greater or equal than M¯f , the message
is considered to comply with the learned behavioral
profile for that feature, and an anomaly score of 0 is
returned. The rationale behind this is that, in the past,
the user has shown a significant number of messages
with that particular fv.
3. If c is less than M¯f , the message is considered some-
what anomalous with respect to that model. Our ap-
proach calculates the relative frequency f of fv as
f =
cfv
N
. The system returns an anomaly score of 1
- f .
The anomaly score for optional features is calculated as:
1. The value fv for the analyzed feature is first ex-
tracted from the message. If Mf contains a tuple
with fv as a first element, the message is consid-
ered to match the behavioral profile, and an anomaly
score of 0 is returned.
2. If there is no tuple in Mf with fv as a first element,
the message is considered anomalous. The anomaly
score in this case is defined as the probability p for
the account to have a null value for this model. In-
tuitively, if a user rarely uses a feature on a social
network, a message containing an fv that has never
been seen before for this feature is highly anomalous.
The probability p is calculated as p = cnull
N
. If Mf
does not have a tuple with null as a first element,
cnull is considered to be 0. p is then returned as the
anomaly score.
As an example, consider the following check against
the language model: The stream of a particular user is
composed of 21 messages. Twelve of them are in English,
while nine are in German. The Mf of the user for that
particular model looks like this:
(<English,12>,<German,9>).
The next message sent by that user will match one of three
cases:
• The new message is in English. Our approach ex-
tracts the tuple <English,12> from Mf , and com-
pares c = 12 to M¯ = 10.5. Since c is greater
than M¯f , the message is considered normal, and an
anomaly score of 0 is returned.
• The new message is in Russian. Since the user never
sent a message in that language before, the message
is considered very suspicious, and an anomaly score
of 1 is returned.
• The new message is in German. Our approach ex-
tracts the tuple <German, 9> from Mf , and com-
pares c = 9 to M¯f = 10.5. Since c < M¯f , the mes-
sage is considered slightly suspicious. The relative
frequency of German tweets for the user is f = c
N
=
0.42. Thus, an anomaly score of 1− f = 0.58 is re-
turned. This means that the message shows a slight
anomaly in the user average behavior. However, as
explained in Section 6.2, on its own this score will
not be enough to flag the message as malicious.
Computing the final anomaly score. Once our system
has evaluated a message against each individual feature
model, we need to combine the results into an overall
anomaly score for this message. This anomaly score is
a weighted sum of the values for all models. We use Se-
quential Minimal Optimization [18] to learn the optimal
weights for each model, based on a training set of in-
stances (messages and corresponding user histories) that
are labeled as malicious and benign. Of course, different
social networks will require different weights for the var-
ious features. A message is said to violate an account’s
behavioral profile if its overall anomaly score exceeds a
threshold. In Section 4.1, we present a more detailed dis-
cussion on how the features and the threshold values were
calculated. More details, including a parameter sensitivity
analysis on the threshold value, are presented in our pre-
vious work [19, 20]. Moreover, we discuss the weights
(and importance) of the features for the different social
networks that we analyzed (i.e., Twitter and Facebook).
Robustness of the Models. In our original paper we show
that it is difficult for an attacker to mimic all the behav-
ioral models used by COMPA [15]. In addition, in our
setup we only used features that are observable from the
outside — if COMPA was deployed by a social network
instead, they could use additional indicators, such as the
IP address that a user is connecting from or the browser
user agent. Novelty of the modelled features. In our pre-
vious paper [15] we show that most of the features used by
COMPA are novel, and were not used by previous work.
In addition, existing systems focus on detecting fake ac-
counts, and therefore look for similarities across differ-
ent accounts to flag them as malicious. In COMPA, con-
versely, we look for changes in the behavior of legitimate
accounts.
4.1 Training the Classifier
As discussed in Section 4, COMPA uses a weighted sum
of feature values to determine whether a new message vi-
olates the behavioral profile of its social network account.
Naturally, this bears the question how to determine opti-
mal feature weights to calculate the weighted sum itself.
To determine the feature weights in COMPA, we applied
Weka’s SMO [21] to a labeled training dataset for both
Twitter and Facebook. A detailed discussion how we pre-
pared the training datasets can be found in our previous
work [15]. Note that this dataset is different than the one
used to evaluate COMPA in Section 7.
While on Facebook, at the time of our experiment, we
could easily infer a user location from her geographic net-
works, Twitter does not provide such a convenient prox-
imity feature. Therefore, we omitted this feature from the
evaluation on Twitter. For Twitter, the weights for the fea-
tures are determined from a labeled training dataset con-
sisting of 5,236 (5142 legitimate, 94 malicious) messages
with their associated feature values as follows: Source
(3.3), Personal Interaction (1.4), Domain (0.96), Hour of
Day (0.88), Language (0.58), and Topic (0.39).
On Facebook, based on a labeled training dataset of 279
messages (181 legitimate, 122 malicious), the weights
were: Source (2.2), Domain (1.1), Personal Interaction
(0.13), Proximity (0.08), and Hour of Day (0.06). Weka
determined that the Language feature has no effect on the
classification. Moreover, as discussed earlier, assessing
the message topic of an unstructured message is a com-
plicated natural language processing problem. Therefore,
we omitted this feature from the evaluation on the Face-
book dataset.
5 Behavioral Profile Stability
Detecting deviations in account behavior is simplified if
the commonly occurring behavior follows mostly regu-
lar patterns. Thus, in this section we ask (and answer)
the question of whether there is a class of social network
accounts that are particularly amenable to such an analy-
sis. Arguably, a social network strategy is a crucial part
for the public relation department of most contemporary
companies. Intuitively, we would expect a well managed
company account to show a more stable behavior over
time than accounts operated by regular users. To assess
whether this intuition is valid we conducted an experiment
and evaluated the message streams of popular companies
for behavioral profile violations. As positive example
# Twitter Account Violations (%) # Twitter Account Violations (%)
1 163 0% 40 derspiegel 2%
2 alibabatalk 0% 41 espn 2%
3 ap 0% 42 imgur 2%
4 bloombergnews 0% 43 msnbc 2%
5 bostonglobe 0% 44 tripadvisor 2%
6 bw 0% 45 twitch 2%
7 ebay 0% 46 xe 2%
8 ehow 0% 47 yahoosports 2%
9 engadget 0% 48 walmart 2%
10 expedia 0% 49 bing 3%
11 forbes 0% 50 nfl 3%
12 foxnews 0% 51 reverso 3%
13 foxnewspolitics 0% 52 blizzardcs 4%
14 gsmarena com 0% 53 google 4%
15 huffingtonpost 0% 54 linkedin 4%
16 imdb 0% 55 yahoofinance 4%
17 latimes 0% 56 cnn 5%
18 lemondefr 0% 57 timeanddate 5%
19 msn 0% 58 yandexcom 5%
20 nbcnews 0% 59 urbandictionary 5%
21 nytimes 0% 60 netflix 6%
22 pchgames 0% 61 weebly 6%
23 reuters 0% 62 stumbleupon 7%
24 skype 0% 63 yahooanswers 7%
25 stackfeed 0% 64 reddit 9%
26 steam games 0% 65 yelp 9%
27 washingtonpost 0% 66 instagram 10%
28 yahoo 0% 67 youtube 10%
29 9gag 1% 68 nih 12%
30 amazon 1% 69 ancestry 13%
31 digg 1% 70 microsoft 13%
32 el pais 1% 71 paypal 13%
33 facebook 1% 72 tumblr 15%
34 ign 1% 73 wikipedia 15%
35 internetarchive 1% 74 wordpress 28%
36 pinterest 1% 75 AskDotCom 39%
37 yahoonews 1% 76 bookingcom 44%
38 abcnews 2% 77 twitter 46%
39 bbcnews 2% 78 guardian 47%
Table 1: Behavioral profile violations of news agency and cor-
porate Twitter accounts within most recent 100 tweets.
of social network compromises, we considered the four
high-profile incidents described previously. As a baseline
comparison we also evaluated the message streams of ran-
domly chosen social network accounts.
5.1 Popular Accounts
To assess whether the behavioral profiles of popular ac-
counts are indeed mostly stable over time we performed
the following experiment. Alexa [22] is a service that
ranks popular websites. We assume that most popular
websites are operated by popular businesses. Thus we
identify the Twitter accounts that correspond to the top 5
entries in each of 16 categories ranked by Alexa (e.g., arts,
news, science, etc.). Additionally, we add the Twitter ac-
counts that correspond to the top 50 entries of Alexa’s top
500 global sites. While a more exhaustive list would be
beneficial, identifying a social network account that cor-
responds to a website is a manual process and thus does
not scale well. Table 1 presents the list of the resulting 78
Twitter accounts after removal of duplicate entries cross
listed in multiple categories.
For each account in this list COMPA then built the be-
havioral profile and compared the most recent 100 mes-
sages against the extracted profile. As for any detection
system, COMPA needs to make tradeoffs between false
positives and false negatives. To tune our system, we used
as ground truth the 4 high-profile incidents described in
Section 2. We configured COMPA to detect such attacks.
We then analyzed the false positive rate that COMPA gen-
erates by using this threshold. Note that since these inci-
dents are the only ones that have been reported for the in-
volved accounts, this experiment resulted in no false neg-
atives.
Table 1 also shows how many of these 100 messages
violated their behavioral profile. The results indicate that
the majority of popular accounts have little variability in
their behavior. As we can see, the majority of the high
profile accounts that we evaluated have a very consistent
behavior. In fact, as we will show in the next section,
such accounts show a considerably more consistent be-
havior than average social network accounts. In these
cases COMPA could protect these accounts and still re-
liably detect compromises without fearing false positives.
A handful of high profile accounts, however, showed
a very variable behavior. In the worst case, the behav-
ior of The Guardian’s Twitter account was so inconsistent
that 47 out of 100 messages would have been flagged by
COMPA as malicious. We suspect that these accounts are
not used by a single person, but instead are managed by
a set of different actors who have different preferences
in terms of Twitter clients and slightly different editing
styles. Our system is currently not able to characterize
accounts with such multi-actor behavior patterns. In the
general case of a single user operating a given account,
however, COMPA can reliably detect and block changes
of behavior.
5.2 Regular Accounts
To assess the consistency of behavioral profiles for regu-
lar accounts, we used COMPA to create 64,368 behavioral
profiles for randomly selected Twitter users over a period
of 44 days. We used the same threshold selected in Sec-
tion 5.1 for this experiment. To this end, every minute,
COMPA retrieved the latest tweet received from the Twit-
ter stream and built a behavioral profile for the corre-
sponding account. 2,606 (or 4%) of these messages vio-
lated their account’s behavioral profile. As we would not
expect random messages to violate the behavioral profile
of the underlying account, we consider these 4% the base
false discovery rate of COMPA. Unfortunately, a 4% false
discovery rate is exceedingly high for a practical deploy-
ment of a detection system such as COMPA. Thus, when
dealing with regular accounts, instead of detecting com-
promises of individual user accounts, COMPA first groups
accounts by means of message similarity into large-scale
campaigns. COMPA declares members of a campaign as
compromised only if a significant fraction of messages
within that campaign violate their respective behavioral
profiles.
Detecting Large-scale Social Network Compromises A
single message that violates the behavioral profile of a
user does not necessarily indicate that this user is compro-
mised and the message is malicious. The message might
merely reflect a normal change of behavior. For example,
a user might be experimenting with new client software
or expanding her topics of interest. Therefore, before we
flag an account as compromised, we require that we can
find a number of similar messages (within a specific time
interval) that also violate the accounts of their respective
senders.
Hence, we use message similarity as a second com-
ponent to distinguish malicious messages from spurious
profile violations. This is based on the assumption that at-
tackers aim to spread their malicious messages to a larger
victim population. In the following section, we discuss
how our system groups together similar messages and as-
sesses their maliciousness.
6 Detecting Large-scale Social Net-
work Compromises
6.1 Grouping Messages
To perform this grouping of messages, we can either first
group similar messages and then check all clustered mes-
sages for behavioral profile violations, or we can first an-
alyze all messages on the social network for profile vio-
lations and then cluster only those that have resulted in
violations. The latter approach offers more flexibility for
grouping messages, since we only need to examine the
small(er) set of messages that were found to violate their
user profiles. This would allow us to check if a group of
suspicious messages was sent by users that are all directly
connected in the social graph, or whether these messages
were sent by people of a certain demographics. Unfortu-
nately, this approach requires to check all messages for
profile violations. While this is certainly feasible for the
social networking provider, our access to these sites is
rate-limited in practice. Hence, we need to follow the
first approach: More precisely, we first group similar mes-
sages. Then, we analyze the messages in clusters for pro-
file violations. To group messages, we use the two sim-
ple similarity measures, discussed in the following para-
graphs.
Content similarity. Messages that contain similar text
can be considered related and grouped together. To this
end, our first similarity measure uses n-gram analysis of a
message’s text to cluster messages with similar contents.
We use entire words as the basis for the n-gram analysis.
Based on initial tests to evaluate the necessary computa-
tional resources and the quality of the results, we decided
to use four-grams. That is, two messages are considered
similar if they share at least one four-gram of words (i.e.,
four consecutive, identical words).
URL similarity. This similarity measure considers two
messages to be similar if they both contain at least one
link to a similar URL. The naı¨ve approach for this simi-
larity measure would be to consider two messages simi-
lar if they contain an identical URL. However, especially
for spam campaigns, it is common to include identifiers
into the query string of a URL (i.e., the part in a URL af-
ter the question mark). Therefore, this similarity measure
discards the query string and relies on the remaining com-
ponents of a URL to assess the similarity of messages. Of
course, by discarding the query string, the similarity mea-
sure might be incorrectly considering messages as similar
if the target site makes use of the query string to identify
different content. Since YouTube and Facebook use
the query string to address individual content, this simi-
larity measure discards URLs that link to these two sites.
Many users on social networking sites use URL short-
ening services while adding links to their messages. In
principle, different short URLs could point to the same
page, therefore, it would make sense to expand such
URLs, and perform the grouping based on the expanded
URLs. Unfortunately, for performance reasons, we could
not expand short URLs in our experiments. On Twitter,
we observe several million URLs per day (most of which
are shortened). This exceeds by far the request limits im-
posed by any URL shortening service.
We do not claim that our two similarity measures rep-
resent the only ways in which messages can be grouped.
However, as the evaluation in Section 7 shows, the sim-
ilarity measures we chose perform very well in practice.
Furthermore, our system can be easily extended with ad-
ditional similarity measures if necessary.
6.2 Compromised Account Detection
Our approach groups together similar messages that are
generated in a certain time interval. We call this the ob-
servation interval. For each group, our system checks all
accounts to determine whether each message violates the
corresponding account’s behavioral profile. Based on this
analysis, our approach has to make a final decision about
whether an account is compromised or not.
Suspicious groups. A group of similar messages is called
a suspicious group if the fraction of messages that violates
their respective accounts’ behavioral profiles exceeds a
threshold th. In our implementation, we decided to use
a threshold that is dependent on the size of the group.
The rationale behind this is that, for small groups, there
might not be enough evidence of a campaign being car-
ried out unless a high number of similar messages vio-
late their underlying behavioral profiles. In other words,
small groups of similar messages could appear coinciden-
tally, which might lead to false positives if the threshold
for small groups is too low. This is less of a concern for
large groups that share a similar message. In fact, even the
existence of large groups is already somewhat unusual.
This can be taken into consideration by choosing a lower
threshold value for larger groups. Accordingly, for large
groups, it should be sufficient to raise an alert if a smaller
percentage of messages violate their behavioral profiles.
Thus, the threshold th is a linear function of the size of
the group n defined as th(n) = max(0.1, kn+ d).
Based on small-scale experiments, we empirically de-
termined that the parameters k = −0.005 and d = 0.82
work well. The max expression assures that at least ten
percent of the messages in big groups must violate their
behavioral profiles to get the group’s users flagged as
compromised. Our experiments show that these threshold
values are robust, as small modifications do not influence
the quality of the results. Whenever there are more than
th messages in a group (where each message violates its
profile), COMPA declares all users in the group as com-
promised.
Bulk applications. Certain popular applications, such as
Nike+ or Foursquare, use templates to send simi-
lar messages to their users. Unfortunately, this can lead
to false positives. We call these applications bulk appli-
cations. To identify popular bulk applications that send
very similar messages in large amounts, COMPA needs to
distinguish regular client applications (which do not au-
tomatically post using templates) from bulk applications.
To this end, our system analyzes a randomly selected set
of S messages for each application, drawn from all mes-
sages sent by this application. COMPA then calculates the
average pairwise Levenshtein ratios for these messages.
The Levenshtein ratio is a measure of the similarity be-
tween two strings based on the edit distance. The values
range between 0 for unrelated strings and 1 for identical
strings. We empirically determined that the value 0.35 ef-
fectively separates regular client applications from bulk
applications.
COMPA flags all suspicious groups produced by client
applications as compromised. For bulk applications, a fur-
ther distinction is necessary, since we only want to discard
groups that are due to popular bulk applications. Popular
bulk applications constantly recruit new users. Also, these
messages are commonly synthetic, and they often violate
the behavioral profiles of new users. For existing users,
on the other hand, past messages from such applications
contribute to their behavioral profiles, and thus, additional
messages do not indicate a change in behavior. If many
users made use of the application in the past, and the mes-
sages the application sent were in line with these users’
behavioral profiles, COMPA considers such an application
as popular.
To assess an application’s popularity, COMPA calcu-
lates the number of distinct accounts in the social net-
work that made use of that application before it has sent
the first message that violates a user’s behavioral profile.
This number is multiplied by an age factor (which is the
number of seconds between the first message of the appli-
cation as observed by COMPA and the first message that
violated its user’s behavioral profile). The intuition be-
hind this heuristic is the following: An application that
has been used by many users for a long time should not
raise suspicion when a new user starts using it, even if it
posts content that differs from this user’s established be-
havior. Manual analysis indicated that bulk applications
that are used to run spam and phishing campaigns over
compromised accounts have a very low popularity score.
Thus, COMPA considers a bulk application to be popular
if its score is above 1 million. We assume that popular
bulk applications do not pose a threat to their users. Con-
sequently, COMPA flags a suspicious group as containing
compromised accounts only if the group’s predominant
application is a non-popular bulk application.
7 Evaluation
We implemented our approach in a tool, called COMPA
and evaluated it on Twitter and Facebook; we collected
tweets in real time from Twitter, while we ran our Face-
book experiments on a large dataset crawled in 2009.
We show that our system is capable of building mean-
ingful behavioral profiles for individual accounts on both
networks. By comparing new messages against these pro-
files, it is possible to detect messages that represent a (pos-
sibly malicious) change in the behavior of the account. By
grouping together accounts that contain similar messages,
many of which violate their corresponding accounts’ be-
havioral profiles, COMPA is able to identify groups of
compromised accounts that are used to distribute mali-
cious messages on these social networks. Additionally,
COMPA identifies account compromises without a subse-
quent grouping step if the underlying behavioral profile is
consistent over time. We continuously ran COMPA on a
stream of 10% of all public Twitter messages on a single
computer (Intel Xeon X3450, 16 GB ram). The main lim-
itation was the number of user timelines we could request
from Twitter, due to the enforced rate-limits. Thus, we
are confident that COMPA can be scaled up to support on-
line social networks of the size of Twitter with moderate
hardware requirements.
We first detail the dataset we used to perform the eval-
uation of our work. Subsequently, we discuss a series of
real world account compromises against popular Twitter
accounts that COMPA could have prevented, and conclude
this section with an evaluation of large-scale compromises
that COMPA detected on the Twitter and Facebook social
networks.
7.1 Data Collection
Twitter Dataset We obtained elevated access to Twitter’s
streaming and RESTful API services. This allowed us
to collect around 10% of all public tweets through the
streaming API, resulting in roughly 15 million tweets per
day on average. We collected this data continuously start-
ing May 13, 2011 until Aug 12, 2011. In total, we col-
lected over 1.4 billion tweets from Twitter’s stream. The
stream contains live tweets as they are sent to Twitter. We
used an observation interval of one hour. Note that since
the stream contains randomly sampled messages, COMPA
regenerated the behavioral profiles for all involved users
every hour. This was necessary, because due to the 10%
random sampling it was not guaranteed that we would see
the same user multiple times.
To access the historical timeline data for individual ac-
counts, we rely on the RESTful API services Twitter pro-
vides. To this end, Twitter whitelisted one of our IP ad-
dresses, which allowed us to make up to 20,000 RESTful
API calls per hour. A single API call results in at most
200 tweets. Thus, to retrieve complete timelines that ex-
ceed 200 tweets, multiple API requests are needed. Fur-
thermore, Twitter only provides access to the most recent
3,200 tweets in any user’s timeline. To prevent wasting
API calls on long timelines, we retrieved timeline data for
either the most recent three days, or the user’s 400 most
recent tweets, whatever resulted in more tweets.
On average, we received tweets from more than
500,000 distinct users per hour. Unfortunately, because of
the API request limit, we were not able to generate pro-
files for all users that we saw in the data stream. Thus,
as discussed in the previous section, we first cluster mes-
sages into groups that are similar. Then, starting from the
largest cluster, we start to check whether the messages vi-
olate the behavioral profiles of their senders. We do this,
for increasingly smaller clusters, until our API limit is ex-
hausted. On average, the created groups consisted of 30
messages. This process is then repeated for the next ob-
servation period.
Facebook Dataset Facebook does not provide a conve-
nient way of collecting data. Therefore, we used a dataset
that was crawled in 2009. We obtained this dataset from
an independent research group that performed the crawl-
ing in accordance with the privacy guidelines at their re-
search institution. Unfortunately, Facebook is actively
preventing researchers from collecting newer datasets
from their platform by various means, including the threat
of legal action. This dataset was crawled from geographic
networks on Facebook. Geographic networks were used
to group together people that lived in the same area. The
default privacy policy for these networks was to allow
anybody in the network to see all the posts from all other
members. Therefore, it was easy, at the time, to col-
lect millions of messages by creating a small number
of profiles and join one of these geographic networks.
For privacy reasons, geographic networks have been dis-
continued in late 2009. The dataset we used contains
106,373,952 wall posts collected from five geographic
networks (i.e., London, New York, Los Angeles, Mon-
terey Bay, and Santa Barbara). These wall posts are dis-
tributed over almost two years (Sept. 2007 - July 2009).
7.2 Detection on Twitter
The overall results for our Twitter evaluation are pre-
sented in Table 2. Due to space constraints, we will only
discuss the details for the text similarity measure here.
However, we found considerable overlap in many of the
groups produced by both similarity measures. More pre-
cisely, for over 8,200 groups, the two similarity measures
(content and URL similarity) produced overlaps of at least
eight messages. COMPA found, for example, phishing
campaigns that use the same URLs and the same text in
their malicious messages. Therefore, both similarity mea-
sures produced overlapping groups.
The text similarity measure created 374,920 groups
with messages of similar content. 365,558 groups were
reported as legitimate, while 9,362 groups were re-
ported as compromised. These 9,362 groups correspond
to 343,229 compromised accounts. Interestingly, only
12,238 of 302,513 applications ever produced tweets that
got grouped together. Furthermore, only 257 of these ap-
plications contributed to the groups that were identified as
compromised.
For each group of similar messages, COMPA assessed
whether the predominant application in this group was a
regular client or a bulk application. Our system identified
12,347 groups in the bulk category, of which 1,647 were
flagged as compromised. Moreover, COMPA identified a
total of 362,573 groups that originated from client appli-
cations. Of these, 7,715 were flagged as compromised.
Overall, our system created a total of 7,250,228 behav-
ioral profiles. COMPA identified 966,306 messages that
violate the behavioral profiles of their corresponding ac-
counts. Finally, 400,389 messages were deleted by the
time our system tried to compare these messages to their
respective behavioral profiles (i.e., within an hour).
False Positives Using the text similarity measure, COMPA
identified 343,229 compromised Twitter accounts in
9,362 clusters. We performed an exhaustive false posi-
tive analysis of COMPA in our previous work [15]. Due
to space limitations, we omit repeating this description
here. In summary, 377 of the 9,362 groups (4%) that
COMPA flagged as containing compromised are labeled
as false positives. Note that each group consists of mul-
tiple tweets, each from a different Twitter account. Thus,
the above mentioned results are equivalent to flagging
343,229 user as compromised, where 12,382 (3.6%) are
false positives.
One characteristic that directly affects the probability
of a false positive detection is the length of the message
stream that is used to learn the behavioral profile. Intu-
itively, the longer a user’s messages stream is, the more
comprehensive is the resulting behavioral profile. For a
detailed discussion and analysis of this intuition, we again
refer to [15].
False Negatives Precisely assessing false negatives in
large datasets, such as the ones we are evaluating COMPA
on, is a challenging endeavor. However, we found af-
ter extensive sampling (64,000 random accounts) that the
grouping feature in COMPA did not cause undue amounts
of false negatives. In our previous work we detail our
analysis to conclude that COMPA suffers from roughly 4%
false negatives in detecting compromised accounts of reg-
ular Twitter users.
7.3 Detection on Facebook
As the Facebook dataset spans almost two years we in-
creased the observation interval to eight hours to cover
this long timespan. Furthermore, we only evaluated the
Facebook dataset with the text similarity measure to group
Network & Similarity Measure Twitter Text Twitter URL Facebook Text
Groups Accounts Groups Accounts Groups Accounts
Total Number 374,920 14,548 48,586
# Compromised 9,362 343,229 1,236 54,907 671 11,499
False Positives 4% (377) 3.6% (12,382) 5.8% (72) 3.8% (2,141) 3.3% (22) 3.6% (412)
# Bulk Applications 12,347 1,569 N/A N/A
# Compromised Bulk Applications 1,647 178,557 251 8,254 N/A N/A
False Positives 8.9% (146) 2.7% (4,854) 14.7% (37) 13.3% (1,101) N/A N/A
# Client Applications 362,573 12,979 N/A N/A
# Compromised Client Applications 7,715 164.672 985 46,653 N/A N/A
False Positives 3.0% (231) 4.6% (7,528) 3.5% (35) 2.2% (1,040) N/A N/A
Table 2: Evaluation Results for the Text (Twitter and Facebook) and URL (Twitter) Similarity measure.
similar messages.
Our experiments indicated that a small number of pop-
ular applications resulted in a large number of false posi-
tives. Therefore, we removed the six most popular appli-
cations, including Mafia Wars from our dataset. Note that
these six applications resulted in groups spread over the
whole dataset. Thus, we think it is appropriate for a social
network administrator to white-list applications at a rate
of roughly three instances per year.
In total, COMPA generated 206,876 profiles in 48,586
groups and flagged 671 groups as compromised (i.e,
11,499 compromised accounts). All flagged groups are
created by bulk applications. 22 legitimate groups were
incorrectly classified (i.e., 3.3% false positives) as com-
promised; they contained 412 (3.6%) users.
7.4 Case studies
As mentioned in Section 5.1, COMPA successfully de-
tected four high-profile Twitter compromises. In the
following, we discuss those incidents in more detail,
highlighting what type of anomalies were picked up by
COMPA compared to the typical behavior of these ac-
counts. In addition, we discuss a compromise that was
simulated by the fast-food company Chipotle on their
Twitter account, for promotional reasons. We demon-
strate that in this case the message did not show partic-
ular anomalies compared to the typical behavior of the
account, and therefore COMPA would have correctly de-
tected it as being authored by their legitimate owners.
Associated Press. Comparing the malicious message
message against the behavioral profile of the @AP ac-
count resulted in significant differences among many fea-
tures that our system evaluates. For example, the fake
news was posted via the Twitter website, whereas the le-
gitimate owners of the @AP account commonly use the
SocialFlow application to send status updates. Further-
more, the fake tweet did not include any links to addi-
tional information, a practice that the @AP account fol-
lows very consistently.
Only two features in our behavioral model did not sig-
nify a change of behavior. The time when the tweet was
sent (i.e., 10:07UTC) and the language of the tweet itself.
The authors of the @AP account as well as the attackers
used the English language to author their content. While
the language is undoubtedly the same, a more precise lan-
guage analysis could have determined an error in capital-
ization in the attacker’s message.
FoxNews Politics. This tweet violated almost all the fea-
tures used by our system. For example, the tweet was
sent in the middle of the night (i.e., 23:24UTC), through
the main Twitter web site. Furthermore, it did not include
a link to the full story on the Fox News website. The
tweet also made extensive use of hashtags and mentions,
a practice not commonly used by the @foxnewspolitics
account.
Skype. COMPA successfully detected the compromise be-
cause the offending message significantly diverged from
the behavioral profile constructed for the Skype account.
The only two features that did not diverge from the be-
havioral profile were the time and language information.
Since the Skype profile as well as the malicious message
were authored in English, COMPA did not detect a de-
viation in this feature. More interestingly, however, the
time the message was sent, perfectly aligned with the nor-
mal activity of the Skype account. We would assume that
an observant legitimate owner of the account would de-
tect such a malicious message during their regular activ-
ity. However, presumably because of the holiday season,
it took more than two hours before the offending mes-
sage was removed by the legitimate owners of the Skype
account. In the meantime, the offending message got
retweeted over 8,000 times. This incident prominently
demonstrates the advantages an automated technique for
the detection of compromised accounts would entail, as
such attacks can have significant negative impact on a
brand’s online reputation.
Yahoo! News. Our system detected significant deviations
of the offending message when compared to the extracted
behavioral profile for the account. Similarly to the above
mentioned cases, the attackers used Twitter’s web portal
to send the offending messages, whereas YahooNews pre-
dominantly relies on the TweetDeck application to post
new content. While YahooNews frequently links to de-
tailed information and often mentions their source by us-
ing the direct communication feature (i.e., @-mentions),
the offending tweets featured neither of these characteris-
tics.
Chipotle. On July 21, 2013 multiple news websites re-
ported that the main Twitter account of the Chipotle Mex-
ican Grill restaurant chain got compromised1. Indeed,
twelve “unusual” successive messages were posted to the
@chipotletweets account that day, before the apparent le-
gitimate operator acknowledged that they experienced is-
sues with their account. Because this was in the midst
of other compromises of high-profile accounts (e.g., Jeep,
Burger King, and Donald Trump), this alert seemed credi-
ble. However, when we ran COMPA on these twelve mes-
sages in question, only minor differences to the behavioral
profile of the Chipotle account emerged. More precisely,
the offending messages did not contain any direct user
interaction (i.e., mentions) – a feature prominently used
by the legitimate operator of that account. However, be-
cause this was the only difference compared to the learned
behavioral profile, COMPA’s classifier did not consider
the deviation significant enough to raise a warning about
an account compromise. Interestingly, three days later,
Chipotle acknowledged that they had faked the account
1At the time of writing, the public timeline of the @chipotletweets
account still contains these tweets.
compromise as a publicity measure [23]. This illustrates
that even trying to fake an account compromise is a non-
trivial endeavor. As mentioned, all other features besides
the direct user interaction were perfectly in line with the
behavioral profile. When we investigated the application
source model for the Chipotle account we learned that it is
almost exclusively managed via the SocialEngage client
application. Thus, for an attacker to stealthily compro-
mise Chipotle’s account, he would also have to compro-
mise Chipotle’s SocialEngage account. A similar attempt
of faking an account compromise staged by MTV [24] did
also not result in COMPA raising an alert. Because of our
limited view of Twitter’s traffic (i.e., we only see a ran-
dom 10% sample), we could not evaluate the faked com-
promise of the BET account staged in the same campaign
by the same actors.
8 Limitations
An attacker who is aware of COMPA has several possi-
bilities to prevent his compromised accounts from being
detected by COMPA. First, the attacker can post mes-
sages that align with the behavioral profiles of the com-
promised accounts. As described in Section 4, this would
require the attacker to invest significant time and com-
putational resources to gather the necessary profile infor-
mation from his victims. Furthermore, social networks
have mechanisms in place that prevent automated crawl-
ing, thus slowing down such data gathering endeavors.
In the case of COMPA protecting regular accounts an
attacker could send messages that evade our similarity
measures, and thus, although such messages might vio-
late their compromised accounts’ behavioral profiles, they
would not get grouped together. To counter such eva-
sion attempts, COMPA can be easily extended with addi-
tional and more comprehensive similarity measures. For
example, it would be straight-forward to create a simi-
larity measure that uses the landing page instead of the
URLs contained in the messages to find groups of simi-
lar messages. Furthermore, more computationally expen-
sive similarity measures, such as text shingling or edit dis-
tances for text similarity can also be implemented. Other
similarity measures might leverage the way in which mes-
sages propagate along the social graph to evaluate mes-
sage similarity.
9 Related Work
The popularity of social networks inspired many scien-
tific studies in both, networking and security. Wilson et
al. ran a large-scale study of Facebook users [25], while
Krishnamurthy et al. provide a characterization of Twitter
users [26]. Kwak et al. analyze the differences between
Twitter and the more traditional social networks [27].
Yardi et al. [28] ran an experiment on the propagation
of spam on Twitter. Their goal was to study how spam-
mers use popular topics in their messages to reach more
victims. To do this, they created a hashtag and made it
trending, and observed that spammers started using the
hashtag in their messages.
Early detection systems for malicious activity on so-
cial networks focused on identifying fake accounts and
spam messages [8, 9, 10] by leveraging features that are
geared towards recognizing characteristics of spam ac-
counts (e.g., the presence of URLs in messages or mes-
sage similarity in user posts). Cai et al. [29] proposed a
system that detects fake profiles on social networks by ex-
amining densely interconnected groups of profiles. These
techniques work reasonably well, and both Twitter and
Facebook rely on similar heuristics to detect fake accounts
[30, 31].
In response to defense efforts by social network
providers, the focus of the attackers has shifted, and a
majority of the accounts carrying out malicious activities
were not created for this purpose, but started as legitimate
accounts that were compromised [12, 2]. Since these ac-
counts do not show a consistent behavior, previous sys-
tems will fail to recognize them as malicious. Grier et
al. [2] studied the behavior of compromised accounts on
Twitter by entering the credentials of an account they
controlled on a phishing campaign site. This approach
does not scale as it requires identifying and joining each
new phishing campaign. Also, this approach is limited
to phishing campaigns. Gao et al. [12] developed a clus-
tering approach to detect spam wall posts on Facebook.
They also attempted to determine whether an account that
sent a spam post was compromised. To this end, the au-
thors look at the wall post history of spam accounts. How-
ever, the classification is very simple. When an account
received a benign wall post from one of their connections
(friends), they automatically considered that account as
being legitimate but compromised. The problem with this
technique is that previous work showed that spam victims
occasionally send messages to these spam accounts [10].
This would cause their approach to detect legitimate ac-
counts as compromised. Moreover, the system needs to
know whether an account has sent spam before it can clas-
sify it as fake or compromised. Our system, on the other
hand, detects compromised accounts also when they are
not involved in spam campaigns. As an improvement to
these techniques, Gao et al. [11] proposed a system that
groups similar messages posted on social networks to-
gether, and makes a decision about the maliciousness of
the messages based on features of the message cluster. Al-
though this system can detect compromised accounts, as
well as fake ones, their approach is focused on detecting
accounts that spread URLs through their messages, and,
therefore, is not as generic as COMPA.
Thomas et al. [14] built Monarch to detect malicious
messages on social networks based on URLs that link
to malicious sites. By relying only on URLs, Monarch
misses other types of malicious messages. For exam-
ple, our previous work [15] illustrates that COMPA detects
scams based on phone numbers and XSS worms spread-
ing without linking to a malicious URL.
WARNINGBIRD [13] is a system that detects spam
links posted on Twitter by analyzing the characteristics
of HTTP redirection chains that lead to a final spam page.
Xu et al. [32] present a system that, by monitoring a
small number of nodes, detects worms propagating on so-
cial networks. This paper does not directly address the
problem of compromised accounts, but could detect large-
scale infections such as koobface [33]. Chu et al. [34]
analyze three categories of Twitter users: humans, bots,
and cyborgs, which are software-aided humans that share
characteristics from both bots and humans. To this end,
the authors use a classifier that examines how regularly
an account tweets, as well as other account features such
as the application that is used to post updates. Using this
paper’s terminology, compromised accounts would fall in
the cyborg category. However, the paper does not provide
a way of reliably detecting them, since these accounts are
often times misclassified as either bots or humans. More
precisely, their true positive ratio for cyborg accounts is
only of 82.8%. In this paper, we showed that we can de-
tect such accounts much more reliably. Also, the authors
in [34] do not provide a clear distinction between compro-
mised accounts and legitimate ones that use third-party
applications to post updates on Twitter.
Yang et al. [35] studied new Twitter spammers that act
in a stealthy way to avoid detection. In their system, they
use advanced features such as the topology of the network
that surrounds the spammer. They do not try to distinguish
compromised from spam accounts.
Recent work in the online abuse area focused on de-
tecting accounts that are accessed by botnets, by either
looking at accounts that are accessed by many IP ad-
dresses [36] or by looking at accounts that present strong
synchronized activity [37]. COMPA can detect compro-
mised accounts that are accessed by botnets as well, but
has the additional advantage of being able to identify and
block hijacked accounts that are used in isolation.
10 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented COMPA, a system to de-
tect compromised accounts on social networks. COMPA
uses statistical models to characterize the behavior of so-
cial network users, and leverages anomaly detection tech-
niques to identify sudden changes in their behavior. The
results show that our approach can reliably detect compro-
mises affecting high- profile social network accounts, and
can detect compromises of regular accounts, whose be-
havior is typically more variable, by aggregating together
similar malicious messages.
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